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August 2010 ABSTRACT 
 
The auction rate bond market grew from inauspicious beginnings in 1985 to representing 
a significant fraction of the municipal bond market in 2007 with a total of 603 issuances 
that year raising more than $35 billion in capital.  Since March of 2008 not a single 
auction rate bond has been issued.  The last issuance coincided with a wave of “failures” 
of auction rate bond auctions during the early winter of 2008.  Pundits have attributed the 
auction failures to a “frozen” market and hint that irrationality on the part of investors 
precipitated the auction failures.  Missing from the headlines is that all auction rate bonds 
have interest rate caps that limit their yields.  We find that, contrary to the impression 
given by news headlines, not all auctions failed and that investors rationally 
discriminated among bonds such that it was primarily those with low caps that 
experienced high failure rates.  We further conclude that, in the absence of such caps, few 
if any, auctions would have failed. 
  
Why Did Auction Rate Bond Auctions Fail During 2007-2008?
1 
 
The first auction rate bond (ARB) was issued in 1985 by Warrick County, Indiana, to 
finance the Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company.  The most recent ARB issuance, 
and perhaps the last, occurred in February 2008.  Between the first and most recent 
issuance, the market grew steadily such that by February 2008, the total dollar amount of 
ARBs outstanding was estimated to be roughly $267 billion.  Thus, from its inauspicious 
beginnings roughly 25 years ago, the market prospered - - at least until 2008.  Consider 
that 2007 witnessed the issuance of 603 ARBs with a total face value of $35.7 billion.  In 
comparison, through the first three months of 2008, only 12 bonds were issued with a 
total face value of $0.162 billion.  Since that time, we have been unable to identify a 
single ARB issuance.  In this article we investigate what happened to the ARB market 
during 2007 and 2008.   
In part, the answer to the question of what happened to the ARB market is 
obvious and straightforward.  To wit, the market experienced a wave of auction “failures” 
during late 2007 and the first half of 2008.  In the wake of the auction failures, new 
issuances stopped.  The failure of the auctions made headline news.  The typical headline 
story attributed the auction failures to investors who “abandoned” the “frozen” market, 
and hinted that the investors, perhaps irrationally, were unwilling to bid for the securities 
at any price.  Consider the following: 
The failure of a string of short-term funding auctions this week is a reminder 
that not only is the credit crunch not over — it’s taken a further step into the 
realm of the irrational. (Barrett [February 13, 2008] Auctions fail on fear of 
fear itself, Dow Jones Capital Markets Reports, pp. 27-29).  
 
And:    2
 
Much of the $350 billion market for auction-rate securities... has been frozen 
since February, when auction failures became widespread.  That has left many 
investors without the ability to sell. (Smith, Scannell, and Rappaport [July 16, 
2008] UBS to buy back up to $3.5 billion in securities, The Wall Street 
Journal, p. C15).  
 
In this article we investigate what factors, other than, perhaps, irrationality on the part of 
investors, contributed to the auction failures.  Before doing so it is useful to offer a short 
primer on the way in which the auctions for ARBs work.   
The coupon rate of interest paid on ARBs is reset at regular intervals through a 
Dutch auction in which buyers pay, and sellers receive, par value for the securities.   
Given that the securities must trade at par, potential buyers submit bids in terms of the 
coupon rate they require for holding the securities until the next auction.  The auction 
agent allocates bonds moving upward from the lowest coupon rate bid until the dollar 
amount of bonds outstanding is fully allocated.  All buyers receive the same “market 
clearing” coupon rate of interest on their bonds so that the market-clearing “price” for an 
issue is the lowest coupon rate at which the cumulative dollar amount of securities 
demanded at or below that rate equals the total dollar amount outstanding. 
An auction “failure” occurs when there are not sufficient bids to clear the market.  
The failure of auctions during late 2007 and early 2008, therefore, gave rise to the 
inference that investors were unwilling to hold the bonds at any conceivable yield.  One 
item omitted from the headline stories, however, is that, as with most floating rate 
securities, ARB periodic reset rates are capped by contractually specified maximum rates.  
With ARBs, because the securities trade at par, the maximum rates play a critical role in 
the market clearing process.  In fact, an auction is deemed to have failed when there are 
not sufficient bids to clear the market at a rate less than a security’s maximum rate.  In   3
official parlance, the rate caps are “maximum auction rates.”  As shorthand, we use the 
term “max rate” interchangeably with “maximum auction rate” throughout this article. 
An alternative explanation to irrationality on the part of investors is that the failed 
auctions occurred because the market yields that investors required to hold the securities 
lay above their maximum auction rates. When this occurred, market participants 
rationally declined to bid at the auctions.  Thus, the missing market participants were 
investors who quite reasonably decided not to bid.  
As a preliminary analysis, we calculate the fraction of auctions that failed, by 
week, beginning with the first week of January 2003 and ending with the third week of 
July of 2008.  Contrary to the impression given by news stories that refer to the frozen 
market, we find that, even at the peak of auction failures, not all auctions failed.
2  Indeed, 
at its peak, in our sample of 793 bonds, the overall auction failure rate was only 46%. 
This observation gives rise to the question of whether auction failures can be 
explained by characteristics of the bonds that were being auctioned.  We propose that 
failed auctions were systematically and negatively related to the level of the bonds’ 
maximum auction rates.  To evaluate this proposition, we undertake three sets of 
analyses.   
First, we estimate the parameters of a logistic model of auction failures.  We find 
that the probability of auction failure is negatively and significantly related to the level of 
bonds’ maximum auction rates - - lower max rates are associated with a higher 
probability of auction failure. 
Second, we observe that there are two generic types of maximum auction rates: 
fixed and floating.  Because the levels of floating max auction rates are typically much   4
lower than the levels of fixed max auction rates, the type of max auction rate can serve as 
a proxy for the levels of the rates and allows a natural dichotomization of the sample.  
When we classify ARBs by type of max rate, we find that auctions for those with floating 
max rates failed at a much higher frequency than did auctions for bonds with fixed max 
rates.  For example, during the tumultuous second week of February 2008, when the rate 
of auction failures in our sample jumped from 18% to 41%, the rate of auction failures 
for bonds with floating maximum auction rates was 93%, while the rate of auction 
failures for bonds with fixed maximum auction rates was 13.1%.  Using a logit model, we 
find that the probability of auction failure is significantly related to the type of maximum 
auction rate - - ARBs with floating max rates were significantly more likely to have 
experienced auction failures than were those with fixed max rates.   
Third, using bonds with successful auctions, we estimate regression models of 
market clearing yields based on bond characteristics and market-wide data.  For bonds 
with failed auctions, we compare the market clearing yields implied by the models with 
the bonds’ maximum auction rates.  We find that the market clearing yields implied by 
the models are significantly higher than the bonds’ maximum auction rates. 
Thus, the data solidly support the proposition that auction failures were directly 
related to the level of maximum auction rates.  Rather than being irrational, investors 
appear to have prudently distinguished among ARBs and chose to bid on those for which 
the market required yields were less than their maximum auction rates. 
We then investigate whether investors were “compensated” for the risk of auction 
failure.  This question has its origins in the official inquiries and civil lawsuits that 
followed shortly on the heels of the failed auctions.
3  One of the focal points of the   5
inquiries and lawsuits is the allegation that ARB investors were duped into buying 
securities that were “cash equivalents.”  We investigate this allegation, albeit 
inferentially, by comparing ARB yields with yields of certain cash equivalent investment 
alternatives including treasury bills (T-bills), certificates of deposit (CDs), and money 
market funds (MMFs).   
In a regression analysis that controls for various differences between ARBs and 
the benchmark alternatives, we find that ARBs provided average returns that were 
significantly greater than the various cash equivalent alternatives.  For example, over the 
period January 2003 through the mid-January 2008, ARBs provided an average annual 
return of 26 basis points above the return of MMFs.  Over the period of September 2007, 
when the auction first auction failure of 2007 occurred, through the second week of 
January 2008, the week just prior to the jump in auction failures of 2008, the spread 
between ARB yields and MMF yields increased to approximately 48 basis points.  
We cannot answer the question of whether individual investors were duped into 
buying ARBs under the false impression that auctions would never fail.  However, the 
data indicate that ARBs were not being priced by market participants as if the securities 
were cash equivalents. 
Auction Rate Bonds 
ARBs are long term floating rate bonds whose coupon interest rates are reset by market 
participants through periodic auctions.  Buyers must pay face or par value for securities 
purchased at auction.  In their bids, potential investors specify an amount at par value and 
a required periodic yield.  At each auction, the market clearing bid is the lowest yield 
such that the cumulative dollar amount of bids with lower yields equals the total   6
outstanding dollar amount of the issue at par value.  The market clearing yield is the yield 
that all holders of the security earn over the interval until the subsequent auction. 
Market participants who already hold a particular security may submit one of 
three types of bids.  Those who wish to sell the security regardless of the market clearing 
yield can submit a sell order.  Those who wish to maintain their positions regardless of 
the market clearing yield can submit a “hold at market” order.  Those who wish to submit 
a specific bid at the auction can do so.  If that bid is below the market clearing yield, the 
investor continues to hold his position.  If that bid turns out to be above the market 
clearing yield, the bidder is deemed to have sold his position.  
A market participant who does not hold the security and wishes to do so can 
submit a buy order that specifies a dollar amount and a yield.  If the bid is less than or 
equal to the market clearing yield, the bidder receives the security.  All market 
participants submit their bids to brokers who, in turn, submit the bids to the auction agent. 
It is the auction agent’s responsibility to determine the market clearing yield by matching 
orders among holders and potential new investors.  
In clearing the market, the auction agent is constrained by a maximum auction 
rate that limits the interest rate that the issuer can be required to pay on the bond.  The 
maximum auction rates, which are specified in each bond indenture, come in one of two 
varieties: fixed rate or floating rate.  As implied by their name, fixed maximum auction 
rates are straightforward, albeit, across securities, there is a wide range of observed fixed 
maximum auction rates with a low of 9% and a high of 25% for the bonds in our sample. 
In contrast to the straightforward fixed max rates, floating max rates exhibit 
significant heterogeneity in their composition.  To begin, each floating max rate is tied to   7
a floating reference rate.  The floating max rates are either tied to the reference rate as of 
the date of the auction or to a moving average of the reference rate over some pre-
specified period of time prior to the auction.  In either case, a floating max rate can be 
specified as the reference rate times some multiplier or the reference rate plus a spread. 
Additionally the magnitude of the multiplier or the additive spread depends on the credit 
rating of the security as of the date of the auction.  Further, in some instances, the floating 
max rate is specified as the minimum of two rates, one of which is the reference rate 
times a multiplier and the other of which is the reference rate plus a spread.  
Reference rates include the one-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), 
the 30-day AA Non-Financial Commercial Paper rate, the 30-day AA Financial 
Commercial Paper rate, the Kenny S&P High Grade Municipal Bond Index, and the 
Securities Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA) Municipal Swap Index 
rate.  Further, the reference rate multipliers vary significantly across ARBs ranging from 
a low of 125% to a high of 500%.  Similar variability occurs in additive spreads that 
range from 1% to 3.5%. 
One example of a floating max auction rate comes from the 2007 series C bond 
issued by the Michigan Housing Development Authority: if the rating of the issue is 
AAA- or higher as of the auction date, the max rate is 150% of the one-month LIBOR as 
of that date; if the rating of the bond is AA+ to AA- as of the auction date, the max rate is 
175% of the one-month LIBOR; if the rating of the bond is A- to A+ as of the auction 
date, the max rate is 200% of the one-month LIBOR; if the rating is BBB- to BBB, the 
max rate is 225% of the one-month LIBOR; and if the rating is below BBB-, the max rate   8
is 250% of the one-month LIBOR.  The bond is tax exempt and is insured by Financial 
Security Assurance Incorporated. 
A second example comes from the Student Loan Revenue Senior Bond issued by 
the Brazos Education Authority in 2006: if the rating of the issue is AA- or better as of 
the auction date, the max rate is one-month LIBOR as of that date plus 1.5%; if the rating 
of the issue is between A+ and A- as of the auction date, the max rate is one-month 
LIBOR plus 2.5%; and if the rating of the issue is below A-, the max rate is one-month 
LIBOR plus 3.5%.  The bond is tax exempt and is guaranteed by the Brazos Education 
Authority, but has no other form of insurance.  
The examples illustrate, but do not exhaust, the many variations in max rates 
across ARBs.  The examples also illustrate that some bonds are tax exempt and others are 
not, and that some are self-insured while others are insured by third-party insurers.   
A further characteristic of ARBs with floating max rates is that all of them also 
have fixed max rates.  At each auction, the binding max rate is the minimum of the two as 
of the auction date.  An auction succeeds when there are sufficient bids at or below the 
maximum auction rate such that the cumulative dollar amount bid is at least equal to the 
dollar amount outstanding at par value.   
For our purposes, the more important outcome occurs when there are not 
sufficient bids to clear the market at a rate less than the bond’s max rate.  These are the 
failed auctions that were much in the headlines during the first six months of 2008.  In the 
instance of a failed auction, current holders of the ARB continue to hold the security 
regardless of their orders.  The problematic investor is the holder who wishes to extricate 
himself from his position.  This investor is stuck, at least until the next auction, and   9
possibly much longer.  Indeed, this investor is stuck until the next successful auction and, 
in the meantime, receives the contractually specified maximum auction rate.  Assuming 
that the bond’s maximum auction rate is below the “market required” rate, investors are 
stuck with a security that is providing a below market return.  
The Evolution and State of the Auction Rate Bond Market 
As we noted, the first ARB was issued in 1985 by Warrick County (Indiana) to finance 
the Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company.  Seven ARBs were issued in 1985 with 
another 34 issued between 1986 and 1990.  Issuances began to pick up in 1991 with 81 
issues and another 129 in 1992.  Over the following 16 years, the number of issuances of 
ARBs ebbed and flowed as capital market activity underwent cycles of expansion and 
contraction, but ARBs, with 603 issued in 2007, had remarkable staying power — at least 
until 2008.
4  
From their inception, it was recognized that ARB auction failures could occur.  
However, auction failures with any type of ARB were few and far between.  According 
to Moody’s, between 1984 (when the first auction rate preferred stock was issued) and the 
end of 2006, auction rate bonds and preferred stocks together experienced a total of only 
13 auction failures out of over 100,000 auctions.
5  The landscape began to shift in the 
latter part of 2007 and erupted dramatically during the first quarter of 2008.  
For the 793 ARS bonds in our sample, which we describe in greater detail below, 
the first auction failure of 2007 occurred in the first week of September.  Another four 
occurred during the remainder of September and through the end of November for a total 
of five failures from over 13,000 auctions.  December witnessed 22 auction failures.  The 
level of auction failures picked up further during January 2008 and into the first week of   10
February, with 158 failures in January and 104 failures in the first week of February.  It 
was during the second week of February that the auction failures surged along with the 
headline stories.  Those stories paint a dire picture for the ARS market:  
Goldman, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and other banks have been telling 
investors the market for these securities [ARS] is frozen — and so is their 
cash. (Anderson and Bajaj [February 15, 2008] New trouble in auction-rate 
securities, The New York Times, p. 6).  
 
And further:  
 
Auction rate securities are the latest corner of the debt market to lock up. Some 
investors can’t sell because no one is bidding. (Maxey [February 20, 2008] 
Discount sales can be boon for investors, The Wall Street Journal, p. C3).  
 
Thereafter, news stories regularly appeared at least through mid-July of 2008 describing 
the ARS market as “frozen” and telling the tale of investors who were holding securities 
for which there was no market.
6  One of the accompanying themes that is that market 
participants were acting “irrationally.”  A variation on that theme is that investors had 
abandoned the market and/or that investors were unwilling to bid at any price leading to a 
“frozen” market.
7 
A further well-reported set of events were the official government inquiries into 
the ARB auction failures and the related lawsuits filed by ARB investors.  The most 
publicized of the official inquiries were those led by the Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Attorney General of the State of New York.
8  
The most widely-reported of the civil lawsuits, but it was only one of many, is that by 
Maher Terminal Holdings, Inc.
9  A common allegation of the inquires and lawsuits is that 
investors were misled by their brokers and bankers into believing that ARS were “cash 
equivalents” that could readily be converted to cash at their par values at any time.     11
ARBs Data 
Descriptive data for the entire ARBs market as of March 15, 2008 are given in Exhibit 
1.
10  The Exhibit presents bonds by year of issuance from 1985 through March 2008.  The 
total number of issues outstanding was 5,636 with an aggregate face amount of $266.5 
billion, an average face amount of $47.3 million, and an average term to maturity of 27.2 
years.  When classified according to auction interval, roughly 40% reset every seven 
days, 20% reset every 28 days, and 40% reset with an interval of 35 days or longer.  The 
remainder, a tiny 0.01%, reset daily. 
As for tax status, 79% are exempt from federal taxation, 67% are exempt from the 
calculation of the alternative minimum tax, and 87% are exempt from state taxation for 
investors who reside in the home state of the issuer.  Finally, 65% of the bonds are 
insured by one of the monoline insurers.  All of the bonds are issued by some form of 
government-related entity.  
Auction Failures 
Exhibit 2 plots the fraction of auctions that failed by week over the time period from the 
first week of September 2007 (the week of the first auction failure in our sample) through 
the second week of July 2008 (the last week for which we have data as we undertake this 
study).  The failure rate in our sample was minimal until December 2007.  During 
December, 22 of the ARS in our sample experienced failures.  In January, auctions began 
to fail in greater numbers.  By the third week of January, the failure rate had reached 
9.7% and by the fourth week of January it had grown to 18.2%.  It was during the second 
week of February that the failure rate increased dramatically.  In our sample, 40.5% of   12
auctions failed during that week.  The rate of failures remained at about that level 
throughout the remainder of the period of our analysis.   
A key point is that even at its peak, the overall failure rate was less than 50%.  
This raises the question of whether there is a common factor that distinguishes the bonds 
with failed auctions from those with auctions that succeeded.  We propose that auction 
failure is directly related to the bond’s maximum auction rate.  In our first analysis of this 
question, we estimate logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is an indicator 
of whether the auction failed.  
To begin, we estimate a base case model that excludes the bonds’ maximum 
auction rates.  As independent variables, for each bond, we include the remaining term to 
maturity of the bond as of the auction date (Maturity), the dollar amount of the face value 
of the issue (Face Value), an indicator variable equal to one for issues rated less than 
AAA (Rating < AAA) as of the week of the auction, and an indicator variable equal to 
one if the bond is insured (Insured).  
For each week, beginning with the third week of January 2008, we estimate a 
cross-sectional model.  We report the average of the time series of the weekly 
coefficients of each variable in Column 1 of Exhibit 3 along with the corresponding t-
statistics.  We begin with the third week of January 2008 because that is the first week for 
which there is a sufficient number of auctions to estimate the model.
11  The average 
pseudo-  R  2 of the base case regressions is 10.3%.  
As a first attempt to determine whether investors were rationally selecting among 
securities in their bidding decisions, we include in our regressions the level of the bonds’ 
max rates (Max Rate) as an independent variable.  The coefficients of this model are   13
reported in Column 2 of Exhibit 3.  The average estimated coefficient of Max Rate is 
negative and statistically significant, indicating an inverse relation between the 
probability of an auction failure and the maximum auction rate — the lower the max rate, 
the higher is the probability of auction failure.  Additionally, the inclusion of Max Rate 
substantially increases the average pseudo-  R  2 of the model, from 10.3% to 57.2%.  
To illustrate the economic importance of the maximum auction rates on the 
probability of auction failure, an increase in the level of the max rate by one standard 
deviation (5.0%) relative to the mean (9.1%) decreases the probability of auction failure 
from 31.1% to 2.1%.  Clearly, the level of the maximum auction rate is not only 
statistically but also economically significant as a determinant of the likelihood of auction 
failure.  These data are consistent with the proposition that auction participants rationally 
avoided auctions in which the maximum auction rates were below market-clearing 
yields.
12 
As a second analysis, we sort the bonds into two categories: those with only fixed 
max rates and those with both a floating and a fixed max rate.  In our sample, 44% of the 
issues have only a fixed max rate.  The fixed max rates tend to be high and the floating 
max rates tend to be low.  As of the dates of the auctions in our sample, the average max 
rate for those bonds with only fixed max rates was 14.1%.  In comparison, for those 
bonds with a floating max rate, the average max rate was 4.4%.  Thus, the type of 
maximum auction rate provides a natural partition of the sample.  
In the third specification of the model, we include an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the issue has a floating max rate and zero otherwise (Floating Max 
Rate).  The estimated coefficient of this variable, reported in Column 3 of Exhibit 3 is   14
positive and statistically significant.  The average pseudo-  R  2 is essentially the same as 
when the level of the max rate is used, suggesting that partitioning by floating versus 
fixed max rate captures the same information as the level of the max rate.  This result is 
particularly helpful because it allows us to classify the sample in a straightforward way 
and compare the fraction of auction failures of ARBs with high (i.e., fixed) max rates 
with the fraction of auction failures of ARBs with low (i.e., floating) max rates.  
Exhibit 4 is a plot of the weekly fraction of failed auctions for the two groups. 
The rate of failures among the group of ARBs with fixed max rates exhibits an uptick in 
the second week of February but quickly subsides.  Even at its peak, the fraction of failed 
auctions with a fixed max rate reaches only 13%.  In comparison, the auction failure rate 
among ARBs with floating max rates reaches 90% in the second week of February and 
stays near or at that level through the second week of July 2008.  Thus, these data, along 
with the regressions of Exhibit 3 are consistent with investors, and potential investors, 
rationally avoiding auctions with max rates less than market-clearing yields. 
Of course, the market-clearing yields required by market participants for failed 
auctions are unobservable.  When an auction fails, the yield is reset to the maximum 
auction rate regardless of whether that rate is above or below what the market-required 
yield would have been had the auction succeeded.  That is, the market yield is truncated 
at the maximum auction rate.  
To assess whether the market-clearing yields of failed auctions would have been 
above or below the bonds’ maximum auction rates had the auctions succeeded, we 
estimate two models of ARB yields.  The first is a cross-sectional model of weekly yields   15
based on bond characteristics.  The second is estimated using a panel of cross-sectional 
and time-series data of bond characteristics and marketwide data. 
In both models, the dependent variable is the weekly market-clearing yield of 
ARBs with successful auctions.  In the cross-sectional model, we estimate the 
coefficients each week, beginning with the first week of September 2007 and ending with 
the second week of July 2008, and use those to calculate the implied market yields of the 
bonds with failed auctions in each week.  With the panel regression, we estimate one set 
of coefficients for the entire time period of September 2007 through July 2008 and use 
those to estimate the implied yields of ARBs with failed auctions over that interval.  The 
virtue of the panel regression is that we can incorporate marketwide variables.  The virtue 
of the cross-sectional model is that the coefficients of the model are allowed to vary each 
week of the analysis. 
An extensive set of literature reports that municipal bond yields are related to the 
variables used in the regressions of Exhibit 3.
13  Thus, we include those as independent 
variables in both regression models.  Both models also include tax indicators to capture 
the cross-sectional differences in the tax status of the bonds.  We include an indicator 
variable set to one for bonds that are taxable at the federal level (Federal Taxable), an 
indicator variable set to one for bonds that are taxable at the state level for investors who 
reside in the state of issuance (State Taxable), and an indicator variable set to one for 
bonds that are subject to the alternative minimum tax calculation (AMT Taxable).  
Additionally, ARBs have embedded in them a put option such that, at each failed 
auction, the bond is “put” to the investor at par value.  To capture this optionality in ARB 
yields, we calculate the degree to which the option is in the money each week as the ratio   16
of the market-clearing yield to the bond’s maximum auction rate (Moneyness) for each 
bond with a successful auction.  To capture volatility, for each week we include a 
forecast of the conditional volatility (Sigma) of the yield of each bond using a 
GARCH(1,1) model.   
The panel regression includes each of the variables used in the cross-sectional 
regressions, along with the level of one-month LIBOR as of the week of the auction and 
the average spread of five-year credit default swaps for investment grade corporations as 
of the week of the auction (CDX Spread).  We include LIBOR as a proxy for the 
marketwide level of interest rates.  We include the CDX Spread as a proxy for the 
sensitivity of investors to the marketwide level of credit risk. 
The first column of Exhibit 5 reports the averages of the time series of the weekly 
coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions along with their t-statistics.  The 
coefficients of the variables have sensible signs and all but the coefficients of Face Value 
and Insured are statistically significant.  Given that we are most concerned with the 
explanatory power of the models, the important statistic is the average adjusted   R  2 of 
the regressions — which is a highly reassuring 67.7%. 
The second column of Exhibit 5 gives the coefficients of the panel regression.  
The coefficients of both LIBOR and CDX Spread are positive and significant.  Thus, the 
higher the level of interest rates (as proxied by LIBOR), the higher is the level of the 
ARBs market-clearing yields; and the greater is the level of marketwide concern with 
credit risk (as proxied by CDX Spread), the higher are ARB market-clearing yields.  In 
this model, at 80.6%, the adjusted   R  2 is also reassuringly high.    17
We use the coefficients of the two models to calculate implied market-clearing 
yields for ARBs with failed auctions.  We then compare the implied market-clearing 
yields with the bonds’ maximum auction rates for the week of the failed auction.  Finally, 
we calculate the fraction of the bonds with failed auctions for which the implied market-
clearing yield is above the bond’s maximum auction rate.  With the cross-sectional 
model, this fraction is 92%; with the panel regression, this fraction is 86%. 
In Exhibit 6, we plot the fraction of failed auctions for each week for which the 
market-clearing yield implied by each model is above the bond’s maximum auction rate. 
The asterisks represent the results using the panel regression; the crosses represent the 
results using the cross-sectional regressions.  As the figure shows, with the exception of 
four weeks, the fraction of failures implied by the panel regression is at or above 80% 
each week.  Likewise, with the exception of four weeks, the fraction of failures implied 
by the cross-sectional model is at or above 80% for each week.  With both models, the 
fraction is often above 90%. 
The results in Exhibit 6, coupled with those in Exhibits 3 and 4, strongly support 
the proposition that auction failures were directly linked to ARB max rates.  Apparently, 
market participants rationally discriminated among ARBs and chose not to bid on those 
for which market-required yield lay above the bond’s maximum auction rate. 
Were ARB Yields Too Low? 
A byproduct of the ARB auction failures were official inquiries undertaken by 
State Attorneys General and the accompanying civil lawsuits filed the by states and by 
individual investors.  Major investment banks and brokerage firms were named as 
defendants in the lawsuits.  One of the primary complaints was that the bankers and   18
brokers misled investors into believing that ARBs were “cash equivalent” investment 
alternatives.
14  For example, from the lawsuit filed by the Attorney General of the State 
of New York:  
UBS financial advisers marketed auction rate securities to UBS retail clients 
and others as liquid, short term investments that were similar to money market 
instruments. Customers then received account statements that reinforced the 
misrepresentations, as statements identified auction rate securities as cash 
equivalent securities. (The People of the State of New York, by Andrew 
Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Plaintiff, against UBS 
Securities LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc., Defendants, July 24, 2008)  
 
Similarly, from the lawsuit filed by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts:  
...Merrill Lynch marketed ARS as safe, cash like, and liquid investments. It 
categorized ARS as “Other Cash” on customers statements, even after the 
market imploded. (Commonwealth of Massachusetts: In the matter of: Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated, Respondent, Administrative 
Complaint, Docket No. 2008-0058)  
 
Of course, we do not have any evidence as to whether any individual investor was duped 
into believing that ARBs were cash-equivalent investments or that auction failures could 
never occur.  We can, however, provide certain inferential evidence by comparing ARB 
yields with contemporaneous yields of various cash-equivalent investment alternatives.  
We compare ARB yields with the seven-day average yields of a sample of tax-exempt 
MMFs, the yields of one-month constant-maturity T-bills, and the yields of seven-day 
CDs.   
In our first analysis, we compare the yields of federally tax-exempt ARBs with 
the yields of federally tax-exempt MMFs.  This comparison obviates the need to adjust 
yields for differences in the federal tax status of the bonds and the benchmark.    19
We estimate weekly cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the yield for that week of federally tax-exempt ARBs minus the contemporaneous 
average yield of federally tax-exempt MMFs for that week.  We estimate the weekly 
regressions for each week for the interval beginning with the first week of January 2003 
and ending with the second week of January 2008.  We end with the second week of 
January 2008 because that is the week prior to the onset of the wave of auction failures in 
our sample.  We drop failed auctions from the analysis. 
As independent variables, the regressions include indicators to identify ARBs that 
are taxable at the state level (State Taxable), ARBs that are subject to the alternative 
minimum tax calculation (AMT Taxable), and indicators that summarize the ARB 
characteristics.  These are Long v. Short (where the indicator is equal to one if the 
remaining term to maturity of the bond is greater than the average term to maturity of the 
bonds in our sample), Large v. Small (where the indicator is equal to one if the dollar 
amount of the issue is greater than the average dollar amount of the bonds in our sample), 
Rating < AAA (where the indicator is equal to one if the bond rating is lower than AAA), 
and Not Insured (where the indicator is equal to one if the bond is not insured). 
In this regression, the intercept is interpreted as the conditional mean of the spread 
between the ARB yields and the benchmark yields after controlling for bond 
characteristics.  Column 1 of Exhibit 7 gives the averages of the weekly coefficients.  The 
average difference between ARB yields and MMF yields over the period from the first 
week of January 2003 through the second week of January 2008 is 26 basis points per 
year.  This difference is statistically significant.    20
To compare ARB yields with the other cash-equivalent securities (i.e., T-bills and 
CDs), we adjust yields for federal taxes.  If an ARB is taxable at the federal level, we 
multiply the yield by (1 – 0.35), where 0.35 is the statutory federal corporate tax rate.  
We also multiply the T-bill and CD yields by (1 – 0.35).
15  To capture any federal tax 
effect not picked up by this tax adjustment, we include an indicator to identify ARBs that 
are taxable at the federal level along with the indicators used in the regressions of 
Column 1.   
As shown in Columns 2 and 3, adjusted for tax status and controlling for bond 
characteristics, ARBs provided statistically significantly higher returns than T-bills and 
CDs.  The “excess returns” are also economically significant.  ARBs provided an annual 
return of 25 basis points greater than T-bills and an annual return of 8 basis points greater 
than CDs.  
We now consider only the period between the first auction failure in our sample, 
the first week of September 2007, through the second week of January 2008.  We present 
the averages of the coefficients of the weekly cross-sectional regressions in Columns 4 –- 
6 of Exhibit 7.  The average spread between ARB yields and the yields of the cash-
equivalent alternatives widened considerably in the last four months of 2007 and into 
2008.  Of particular note, in the regression of Column 4, in which we include only tax-
exempt ARBs and tax-exempt MMFs, the average spread is 48 basis points.  This 
compares with a spread of 26 basis points in the parallel regression in Column 1.   
Apparently, investors became increasingly concerned about possible auction failures 
during the fall of 2007 and into January 2008 and, as a consequence, increased their 
required yields relative to those of various cash-equivalent alternatives.   21
Thus, according to our analyses, ARBs provided yields significantly above cash-
equivalent alternatives.  We cannot determine whether any individual investor was misled 
about the liquidity of ARBs.  However, according to the results in Exhibits 7, regardless 
of whether we use MMF, T-bill, or CD yields as the benchmark, market participants were 
not pricing ARS as if they were cash-equivalent securities.  
Conclusions 
In this study we investigate the market for auction-rate securities prior to and during the 
wave of auction failures that occurred during the winter through the spring and into the 
summer of 2008.  Headline stories have attributed these failures to “irrationality” on the 
part of investors and hint that market participants were unwilling to bid for the bonds at 
any price.  We conjecture that market participants recognized that ARB yields are capped 
by maximum auction rates that limit the yield that the bonds can pay.  Further, we 
conjecture that if the market-clearing yields of bonds that experienced auction failures 
had been observable, they would have been above the bonds’ maximum auction rates. 
Thus, investors quite reasonably did not bid at these auctions. 
Consistent with these propositions, we find, after controlling for other bond 
characteristics in a regression analysis, that the likelihood of auction failure was 
negatively and significantly related to the level of the bonds’ maximum auction rates — 
the lower the maximum auction rate, the higher was the likelihood of auction failure.  We 
then estimate regression models of market-clearing yields based on ARBs with successful 
auctions and use these to calculate implied market-clearing yields of ARBs with failed 
auctions.  We find that in over 80% of the cases in which an auction failed, the implied   22
market-clearing ARB yield was above the bond’s maximum auction rate.  This result is 
also consistent with our conjecture. 
We then address the question of whether ARB yields compensated investors for 
bearing the risk of being “stuck” with an ARB because of an auction failure.  Here we 
find, after controlling for bond characteristics, that ARBs did provide higher returns than 
money market funds, Treasury bills, and certificates of deposit.  The implication is that 
market participants were pricing ARBs so as to be compensated for a possibility of 
auction failure. 
Overall, the results of our analysis are reassuring for economists who are likely to 
be mystified by the idea that auctions can fail.  After all, there must be some price at 
which investors are willing to buy any asset.  In the case of failed ARB auctions, those 
prices were apparently unobservable in that they lay above the bonds’ maximum auction 
rates.  Our analysis suggests that in the absence of the bonds embedded maximum 
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Exhibit 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Auction Rate Bonds 
 
Number of Total Average Fraction of Fraction of 
Issues Face Value Marturity Tax-Exempt Issues Insured Issues
1 day 7 days 28 days3 5  d a ys (in Mil $) (in Years)
1985 7 1 4 0 2 397.3 35.0 1.000 0.857
1986 1 0 0 0 1 50.0 40.0 1.000 1.000
1987 3 0 0 0 3 119.0 40.0 1.000 1.000
1988 17 0 3 3 11 761.5 26.1 1.000 0.941
1989 5 0 0 0 5 176.5 30.2 1.000 0.600
1990 8 0 2 0 6 310.3 33.3 1.000 0.375
1991 81 2 1 3 75 1769.8 28.9 1.000 0.642
1992 129 1 12 6 110 2938.3 25.9 0.992 0.752
1993 277 5 10 4 258 3798.7 20.8 1.000 0.643
1994 134 4 21 10 98 3764.4 23.4 0.881 0.597
1995 116 0 20 17 79 4087.8 26.1 0.698 0.414
1996 88 0 8 15 65 2758.0 26.9 0.682 0.398
1997 107 0 20 21 66 4317.7 28.7 0.776 0.467
1998 161 6 25 42 88 6352.0 26.8 0.689 0.410
1999 206 9 57 49 91 8529.3 25.7 0.704 0.534
2000 287 3 104 90 90 12645.3 27.3 0.655 0.477
2001 316 5 99 101 111 14772.8 28.0 0.722 0.576
2002 497 6 156 146 189 26143.7 28.8 0.714 0.588
2003 732 8 256 168 300 38064.2 26.3 0.820 0.686
2004 755 5 351 167 232 39631.4 27.1 0.797 0.732
2005 563 5 338 88 132 29090.3 28.0 0.842 0.748
2006 531 2 317 116 96 30191.3 29.1 0.729 0.678
2007 603 8 418 93 84 35671.2 28.2 0.826 0.731
2008 12 0 12 0 0 162.0 14.9 0.917 0.417






Notes: This table presents selected descriptive data by year of issuance for auction rate bonds outstanding as of March 15, 2008.   26
Exhibit 2 




Notes: This figure plots the weekly fraction of failed auctions for the sample of 793 
auction rate bonds from the first week of September 2007 through the second week of 
July 2008.   27
Exhibit 3 
Coefficients of a Logit Model of Auction Rate Bond Auction Failures 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 4.513 2.506 -5.811
(6.21) (6.81) (-1.28)
Maturity -1.237 0.804 -0.614
(-5.87) (6.09) (-3.66)
Face Value -0.593 -0.215 -0.669
(-6.00) (-1.73) (-5.16)
Insured 0.867 0.419 2.932
(1.79) (1.27) (1.02)




Floating Max Rate 8.690
(5.09)
pseudo-R squared 0.103 0.572 0.552
W3 Jan-08 - W2 Jul-08
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of an auction failure model for auction 
rate bonds. The conditional failure probability is modeled as a logistic distribution. For 
each week in the sample beginning with the third week of January 2008 (W3 Jan-08) and 
ending with the second week of July 2008 (W2 Jul-08), we run a cross-sectional logit 
model. Reported parameters are obtained by averaging the weekly estimated coefficients 
for each variable. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample is composed of 
793 auction rate bonds for which we have the time series of credit ratings.   28
Exhibit 4 
Fraction of Failed Auction Rate Bond Auctions by Type of Maximum Auction Rate 
 
Notes: This figure plots the weekly fraction of failed auctions for the sample of 793 
auction rate bonds from the first week of September 2007 through the second week of 
July 2008.   29
Exhibit 5 
Regression Models of Auction Rate Bond Market-Clearing Yields 
 






Face Value 0.001 0.017
(0.11) (0.52)
Federal Taxable 0.793 0.786
(5.64) (5.05)
State Taxable 0.322 0.262
(6.31) (2.70)




Rating < AAA 0.258 0.066
(8.16) (0.88)










R squared 0.677 0.806
W1 Sep-07 - W2 Jul-08
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of linear regression models of auction 
rate bond yields based on auction rate bond characteristics. We estimate two models: the 
first is a cross-sectional model that we re-estimate every week; the second is a panel 
regression model that we estimate using all available data. The dependent variable is the 
annualized yield of the auction rate bonds. Reported coefficients in Column 1 are the 
average of the weekly cross-sectional regression coefficients. The t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The sample is 793 auction rate bond issues for which we have the time 
series of credit ratings. The data used to obtain the estimates reported in this table 
encompass the first week of September 2007 (W1 Sept-07) through the second week of 
July 2008 (W2 Jul-08).   30
Exhibit 6 




Notes: This figure plots the fraction of failed auctions for each week for which the 
market-clearing yield implied by the models is above the bond’s maximum auction rate 
over the time period from the first week of September 2007 through the second week of 
July 2008.   31
Exhibit 7 
Regression Model of Auction Rate Bond Yields versus Yields of Cash-Equivalent Investment Alternatives 
 
Cash Equivalent MMF T-BILL CD MMF T-BILL CD
Investment Alternative: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.259 0.253 0.082 0.482 1.284 0.392
(17.67) (6.49) (3.79) (4.71) (9.20) (4.03)
Long vs. Short Maturity 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.087 0.086 0.089
(3.98) (2.33) (2.40) (7.96) (7.17) (8.29)
Small vs. Large Size 0.037 0.041 0.04 0.047 0.04 0.04
(11.86) (10.65) (10.42) (2.77) (2.52) (2.51)
Federal Taxable -0.178 -0.178 -0.237 -0.247
(-11.92) (-11.98) (-4.55) (-4.67)
State Taxable 0.225 0.251 0.249 0.162 0.161 0.164
(7.02) (6.92) (6.85) (12.33) (9.05) (9.71)
AMT Taxable 0.258 0.258 0.561 0.561
(12.12) (12.07) (4.37) (4.30)
Not Insured 0.014 0.006 0.008 -0.226 -0.218 -0.214
(1.56) (0.63) (0.91) (-9.54) (-9.84) (-9.40)
Rating < AAA 0.105 0.104 0.106 0.601 0.602 0.598
(6.53) (6.52) (6.69) (16.64) (16.60) (16.06)
R squared 0.134 0.246 0.245 0.161 0.195 0.200
W1 Jan-03 - W2 Jan-08 W1 Sep-07 - W2 Jan-08
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients of weekly cross-sectional regressions of the difference between auction rate bond 
yields and the yields of cash-equivalent investment alternatives against auction rate bond characteristics. The dependent variable is the 
difference between the yield of an auction rate bond and the yield of one of the short-term investment alternatives. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The data used encompass the time period from the first week of January 2002 (W1 Jan-02) through the second 
week of January 2008 (W2 Jan-08).   32
END NOTES 
 
1 This article is based on “Auction Failures and the Market for Auction Rate Securities,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2010), p. 451. 
 
2 Kim and Anand [February 21, 2008].  
 
3 Scheer [January 18, 2008], Bajaj [April 18, 2008], and Morgenson [June 27, 2008]. 
 
5 Special Report, Moody’s Investors Service [February 20, 2008]. 
 
6 Rappaport and Karmin [February 14, 2008], Maxey [February 20, 2008], Kim and 
Anand [February 21, 2008], and Cowen [March 23, 2008]. 
 
7 Chasan (January 24, 2008), Norris [February 8, 2008], Rappaport and Scannell 
[February 22, 2008], and Forsyth [March, 3, 2008]. 
 
8 Bajaj [April 18, 2008] and Story [(July 25, 2008]. 
 
9 Scheer [January 18, 2008], Frank [February 14, 2008], and Henry [February 18, 2008]. 
 
10 The bond data used in our analyses are from Bloomberg with all yields expressed in 
annualized terms.  We obtain time series of credit ratings from Standard & Poors (S&P).   
 
11 We are unable to estimate a cross-sectional logit model for the weeks prior to the third 
week of January 2008.  Because there are not enough auction failures during those weeks, 
the maximization algorithm does not converge. 
 
12 Similar results are reported by Han and Li [2010]. 
 
13 Benson, Kidwell and Koch [1981], Buser and Hess [1986], and see, e.g., Chalmers 
[1998]. 
 
14 Morgenson [March 9, 2008] and Kim [April 1, 2008]. 
 
15 Because there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the marginal tax rate (see, e.g., 
Ang, Bhansali, and Xing [2008]), we conduct sensitivity analysis by varying the tax rate 
from 30% to 60%.  The coefficients of the intercepts are similar to those reported in 
Exhibit 7. 
 